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ABSTRACT
Using data from 17 OECD countries over the 1960-96 period, we investigate the impact of
institutions on the relative employment of youth, women, and older individuals. Theoretically, we show
that labor market institutions meant to improve workers’ income share imply larger disemployment
effects for groups whose labor supply is more elastic. Using an empirical model that allows us to control
for unmeasured country-specific factors that affect relative employment and unemployment, we find that,
for both men and women, more extensive involvement of unions in wage-setting significantly decreases
the employment rate of young and older individuals relative to the prime-aged, with no significant effects
on the relative unemployment of these groups. In contrast, a larger role for unions has insignificant effects
on male-female employment differentials, but raises female unemployment relative to male
unemployment. These results suggest that union wage-setting policies price the young and elderly out of
employment and drive disemployed individuals in these groups to non-labor-force (education, retirement)
states. A possible scenario for women is that high union wages encourage female labor force
participation, but that women who would otherwise be disemployed by high wage floors are able to find
work in unregulated sectors or are absorbed by public employment.
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1. Introduction 
In 1973, OECD standardized unemployment rates were between 2 and 3.2% for most European 
countries, and even lower in several (OECD 1983).  By 1995, unemployment had risen in all of 
these countries, averaging 10.7% in the European Union (OECD 2000). The experience of the 
United States strongly contrasts with that of these other OECD countries. In 1973, U.S. 
unemployment was 4.8% or roughly double that of other OECD countries.  By 1995 it was 5.6% 
or about half that of the European Union. This reversal of unemployment fortunes motivates a 
vast literature aimed at explaining these and other patterns of cross-country unemployment 
evolution. Some studies emphasize European labor market institutions, such as high levels of 
union coverage and generous social insurance benefits, as reasons for high unemployment 
(OECD 1994; Siebert 1997; Nickell and Layard 1999; Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel, and Quintini 
2001).  Restrictive monetary policy in Europe (Ball 1997 and 1999) and other macroeconomic 
shocks are found to explain a large portion of diverging unemployment experiences, especially 
when interacted with institutional wage rigidities (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000; Ball 1997; 
Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2002). Public employment patterns have also been shown to play a 
potentially important role (Algan et al, 2002). Finally, and most relevantly to our approach here, 
within-country unemployment developments are empirically related to broad wage-inequality 
changes, and such demographic factors as a more rapidly falling size of the youth population also 
arguably contributed to the decrease in the U.S. relative unemployment rate (Bertola, Blau and 
Kahn 2002). 
This paper’s perspective is complementary to that of aggregate unemployment analyses. 
We investigate the effects of macroeconomic forces and labor market institutions on the relative 
employment of specific demographic groups—youth, women, and older individuals.  Our focus 
on the labor market outcomes of these groups is most readily justified by the fact that their 
unemployment and (especially) employment rates are much more variable than those of prime-
age males (Bertola, 1999). The labor market position of demographic groups other than prime-
age males has, not surprisingly, featured very prominently in the policy debates of industrialized   2
countries.  Considerable attention has been paid to youth employment problems in Europe 
(Blanchflower and Freeman 2000). The labor market prospects of older workers importantly 
affect national policies to insure the living standards of the elderly and the sustainability of 
pension systems in the face of an aging population.  And, while it is unclear whether or not 
equal-opportunity prescriptions and parental leave policies have actually raised female 
employment and labor force participation (Blau and Kahn 2000a, Ruhm 1998), the relative 
employment outcomes of women are closely scrutinized in most OECD countries. 
There are, in addition, important methodological reasons to focus on the relative 
employment of subgroups. This approach makes it possible to formulate and test sharper 
predictions of the effects of labor market institutions than is the case for aggregate labor market 
indicators.  Consider, for example, centralization of union wage setting and employment 
protection legislation (EPL). More centralized wage bargaining may or may not increase overall 
wages and unemployment, because the greater bargaining power associated with more extensive 
union coverage may be offset by wage restraint resulting from the union’s awareness of macro-
level wage effects (Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Nickell and Layard 1999).  Centralized wage 
setting does, however, tend to cause some compression of the distribution of wages in practice 
(Blau and Kahn 1996a, b), and such compression should unambiguously decrease the relative 
employment of low-productivity worker groups regardless of whether it decreases or increases 
each group’s employment level.  EPL also has ambiguous effects on overall employment, since it 
discourages both layoffs and hires. But if, as is likely, it has smaller effects on inflows from out 
of the labor force than on layoff rates, it should increase unemployment (and decrease 
employment) of labor market entrants, such as youths and women, relative to incumbents. In 
these and other instances, theory has ambiguous implications for aggregate employment and 
unemployment rates, but offers sharp predictions on group-relative effects of labor market 
institutions.  
Empirical testing of predictions about group-relative effects is also simpler than in the 
case of aggregate outcomes. First, reverse causality (such as increasing generosity of   3
unemployment insurance benefits in response to high unemployment) may well be less important 
when one is examining relative employment or unemployment than their corresponding 
aggregates.  Second, studying relative employment alleviates the potential biases in cross-
sectional studies due to omitted country-specific variables to the extent that they affect the 
employment of different groups in a similar way.   However, these omitted factors may affect 
relative employment outcomes by influencing the various subgroups differently.  For this reason, 
in our empirical work, we control for country effects.   We are able to do so because we have 
compiled a data base with time-varying institutional measures. 
This paper offers not only new empirical results, but also a simple and novel 
interpretation of wage compression and disemployment of “outsiders.”  Specifically, in Section 
4, we present a model of union behavior which shows that policies meant to increase workers’ 
surplus from employment imply larger union wage markups and hence larger falls in 
employment for groups with more elastic labor supply, other things equal.  This model implies 
that union bargaining will raise the relative wages and lower the relative employment of youth, 
older individuals and women (compared to the prime-aged and males) to the extent that these 
groups have more elastic labor supply schedules, as is likely.  Intuitively, unions choose to raise 
the wages most for groups with the best alternatives to paid employment:  schooling (youth), 
home production (women), and retirement (older individuals).  As we discuss below, wage 
compression (at least for young workers and women relative to prime age men) and relative 
disemployment of outsiders are hard to rationalize under other models of union behavior.    
 
2.  Previous empirical approaches  
Our paper is similar in spirit to a group of cross-country, time series studies of the impact of 
institutions on the overall unemployment rate (Belot and van Ours 2000; Bertola, Blau and Kahn 
2002; Scarpetta 1996; Daveri and Tabellini 2000; Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini 2001).  
We offer new insights and evidence by focusing on relative employment, as is also recently done 
by Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2001), who however study only youth and prime-age   4
relative unemployment rates and (assuming fixed institutions) do not control, as we do below, for 
country-specific effects in estimating the impact of institutions on relative employment.  
There is abundant evidence that labor market institutions affect the wage distribution, but 
evidence on the impact of institutions on relative employment is mixed (Blau and Kahn 1999; 
2002). Within-country studies focusing on the impact of changes in union coverage or in 
institutions associated with collective bargaining have found evidence of negative effects on low-
skill employment from union intervention.
1 Evidence from cross-country studies, however, is 
scarce and less conclusive. Studies comparing two or three countries with different levels of 
unionization offer mixed support for theoretical predictions: in most of the studies, unionization 
is found to imply more compressed and less flexible wage structures, but not less favorable 
employment opportunities for low-skill workers; however, in one study both the predicted wage 
and employment outcomes for the less-skilled were observed, although the employment effects 
were small.
2 
Country studies may offer valuable (if often only implicit) detailed controls for country-
specific factors.
3  However, they yield evidence that is not only mixed, but also hard to 
extrapolate to other countries and periods. More readily generalizable are cross-sectional studies 
that pool data across a number of countries with different institutional arrangements. Nickell and 
Bell (1995) find little evidence of more pronounced relative unemployment increases for the 
                                                           
1 See, e.g., Edin and Topel’s (1997) study of Sweden’s “solidarity bargaining” period of 1968-1983, and Kahn’s 
(1998) study of the Norwegian 1987-91 wage-compression episode. In both cases, raising floors resulted in sharp 
employment declines for low-skill or low-education workers (and in low wage industries, on which see also Davis 
and Henrekson, 1997).  
2 For example, Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999) found that over the 1980s, relative wages were more rigid in 
France than in Canada, where in turn wages were less flexible than in the U.S. Yet, relative employment across skill 
levels changed similarly in all the three countries. Krueger and Pischke (1998) and Blau and Kahn (2000a) similarly 
find that the wages and employment of low-skill German workers both changed more favorably than those in the 
U.S. over the 1980s.  However, in Freeman and Schettkat’s (2000) study of the US and Germany from the 1970s to 
the 1990s, the relative wages of low-skill men fell in the United States compared to Germany, while their relative 
employment fell in Germany compared to the US.  But these effects were too small to account for much of the rise 
in the overall German unemployment rate compared to the US. 
3 Among the many country-specific features influencing employment outcomes alongside standard labor market 
institutions, availability of public sector jobs for low-skill workers may play an important role. See Blau and Kahn 
(2000a) for a discussion of the German-U.S. case, Edin and Topel (1997) and Björklund and Freeman (1997) for 
evidence on Sweden, Kahn (1998) for the Norwegian case, and Algan et al (forthcoming) for theory and evidence on 
the impact of public jobs on aggregate employment and unemployment.     5
less-educated in countries with more rigid labor markets. In contrast, Kahn (2000), analyzing 
data from 15 OECD countries over the 1985-94 period, finds that collective bargaining and 
coordinated wage-setting are not only negatively associated with age-related and education-
related wage differentials, but also with the relative employment of the young (but not the less-
educated). Similarly, Blau and Kahn (1996a) find for the 1980s that, among men, the 
employment-to-population ratio of low skilled relative to middle skilled workers (defined by age 
and education) was higher in the U.S. and the UK than in countries (Germany, Austria, Norway) 
with more highly unionized labor markets and more compressed wage structures.  A problem 
with these and other cross-sectional studies is that omitted country-specific factors may account 
for the observed relative wage and relative employment patterns. For example, Nickell (1997, 
p.66-67) notes that most of the apparent employment effects of EPL are accounted for by low 
female employment rates in Southern Europe – with no effect on prime-age males – and that the 
evidence may thus reflect cultural difference rather than policy effects.  
We overcome these problems with earlier country studies by examining the impact of 
institutions on relative employment in a regression context.  Unlike this earlier work, we 
examine 17 countries over the 1960-96 period and hence obtain more readily generalizable 
results.  And, in contrast to earlier cross-sectional studies, our data on time-varying institutions 
enable us also to control for country effects and thereby address concerns of country-specific 
omitted variables, such as the cultural factors Nickell (1997) mentions.  Finally, none of these 
earlier studies provides any theoretical justification for the phenomena of wage compression and 
relative disemployment of outsiders, a central focus of the theoretical model presented below. 
 
3. The facts 
Figure 1 displays descriptive graphs of each country’s employment rate for 1995-96 plotted 
against the rate for 1970-74.  The data are presented separately by sex and refer to three age 
groups: young (15-24), prime-aged (25-54), and older (55+).  The employment rate is the 
proportion of the population in the indicated age-sex group that is employed.  Employment rates   6
are averaged over the indicated period and the graphs include the subset of countries for which 
complete data are available in both periods: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, 
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Each graph includes a 45° line to 
clarify the trend (note that the origins of the horizontal and vertical axes are not the same across 
graphs).   
The first column of graphs in Figure 1 displays information on youth. Employment rates 
of young men (in the top graph) fell over the period in all countries. The decline was relatively 
small in the United States, where the employment rate fell from 58.5% to 53.6%, compared to a 
considerably larger decrease from 67.3% to 46.3%, on average, in the other countries. Only 
Canada had a smaller decline than the United States. Employment rates of young women (in the 
bottom graph) also fell in most countries, with the exception of the United States and Canada, 
where the ratio increased, and Australia, where it was stable.  As in the case of males, 
employment rates of young women increased in the United States relative to the average for 
other countries: the rate rose from 40.0% to 49.6% in the United States and fell from 49.2% to 
41.2% elsewhere on average.  Thus, for both young men and young women, the U.S. went from 
being a relatively low employment rate country in 1970 to a relatively high employment rate 
country in 1995.  France, Italy, and Spain had especially large declines in the incidence of 
employment for youth. 
  Consider next prime-age employment rates, shown in the middle column of graphs. In 
marked contrast to the comparison for youth, the U.S. falls squarely in the middle of the cross-
country cluster of observations. For men, the employment rate declined from 93.1% to 88.3% in 
the United States and from 94.3% to 86.0% elsewhere on average.  The employment rates of this 
demographic group are very narrowly concentrated around 95% in the earlier period. Their 
dispersion increases in 1995-96, when all employment rates are lower (by modest amounts, 
except in Spain and Finland). Both the declines and their dispersion, however, are modest in 
comparison to that observed for young men. Employment of prime age men appears to have been   7
much better protected against the adverse labor market of the 1980s and 1990s than employment 
of the young.  
In contrast, to the declines in employment rates of prime age men, employment of prime-
age women rose substantially everywhere.  The U.S. experienced a larger increase in 
employment rates for this group (from 47.4% in 1970 to 73.4% in 1995) than the average for the 
other countries (from 46.1% to 65.2%), but the difference was not large. And Canada and 
Sweden had substantially larger increases in prime age women’s employment rates than did the 
U.S.   
  Finally, consider the information displayed in the last column of graphs in Figure 1 for 
older men and women.  Employment rates of older men declined sharply in all countries. Those 
of older women also tended to decline but more modestly, and from much lower initial levels. 
Differences between the U.S. experience and that in the other countries for these groups were not 
as large as for youth.  The employment rate of older males fell by slightly less in the United 
States (from 53.0% to 35.5%) than elsewhere (averaging 51.0% in 1970 and 30.2% in 1995).  
For older women, the trends in employment rates in the United States and the other countries 
were quite similar, falling from 23.6% to 20.8% in the U.S. and from 18.1% to 14.4% on average 
elsewhere. 
 
4. A simple model of labor market institutions and relative employment effects 
It may appear somewhat puzzling that, in labor markets that are more unionized than in the 
United States, employment of secondary worker groups (“outsiders”) is relatively low.  If prime-
age male “insiders” wield greater bargaining power, should they not use that power to boost their 
wages relative to outsiders, and work less as a result?  In this section, we proceed to show with a 
simple model that unions—or, more generally, policies and institutions aimed at improving 
workers’ welfare—raise the relative pay (and lower the relative employment) of groups with 
more elastic labor supply schedules. The model is focused on the wage-employment tradeoffs 
faced by different groups of workers, and abstracts from many important aspects of union-  8
management bargaining. Combining optimizing behavior by union leaders and realistic 
differences in group-specific participation elasticities, however, the model offers a simple 
explanation both for wage compression by age and gender, and for larger disemployment effects 
for young, female, and older individuals.  As discussed below, this combination of relative wage 
and employment outcomes is difficult to rationalize otherwise. 
  The basic insight can be illustrated in a simple log-linear analytical framework. The data 
we analyze below cannot distinguish between the hours and participation dimensions of labor 
supply: only zero-one employment and participation rates are available. Accordingly, we model 
group-level labor demand and participation decisions in terms of within-group composition 
effects at the level of an entire labor market, supporting a stylized representation of industrial 
relations in many European countries. To focus on the relationship between group i’s  
employment and wage, demand or supply cross-group interaction terms are omitted in the formal 
model (we discuss the scope for such interactions briefly when summarizing the results below).  
Consider the willingness-to-work function    
wi=si +εi(li-ni),                                                                   (1) 
where li  denotes the logarithm of the number of participating individuals and wi the logarithm of 
each worker’s take-home pay; si and ni are labor supply shifters; and εi is the inverse elasticity of 
the group’s labor supply, which depends on factors such as non-labor income, partners’ wages, 
and non-employment uses of time. The opportunity cost of working is constant within the group 
if εi=0. Larger values of this parameter index increasingly inelastic labor supply schedules: as ε i 
tends to infinity, labor market participation tends to ni, which may vary across groups but is 
independent of the wage. Let labor market demand for the same group also be approximated by a 
log-linear schedule,  
wi=ai-ηili                                                               (2) 
where the parameter a indexes productivity, w is the log of employer labor cost, and 0<ηi<1 is 
the elasticity of the inverse labor demand schedule facing group i.   9
  Under competition, supply equals demand, and we have for log of competitive wages and 
competitive employment: 
  wi =[ηi/(εi+ηi)]si - [εiηi/(εi+ηi)]ni + [εi/(εi+ηi)]ai ,                                     (3)                         
  li =(ai– si)/( εi+ηi) + [εi/(εi+ηi)]ni .                                                            (4)  
Wages are quite intuitively predicted to be higher for groups with higher productivity (indexed 
by a), smaller size (indexed by n), better things to do out of employment (indexed by s); the 
ceteris paribus implications of different demand and supply elasticities are similarly intuitive. 
Note that it is possible that some workers, such as women, encounter labor market 
discrimination. Indeed, an extensive literature on the gender pay gap suggests that both gender 
differences in productivity and discrimination play a role in causing the observed differential.
4 
The possibility of discrimination can easily be accommodated in the model by adjusting “true” 
productivity by the discrimination coefficient with a representing adjusted productivity.  Since 
this issue is not central to our concerns here and leaves our basic reasoning unchanged, we do not 
explore it further but note that the adjusted productivity interpretation of a is most likely the 
relevant one for women.  
 
4.1 Unionization and the elasticity of participation 
Now suppose the group of workers with labor demand schedule as in (2) and marginal 
opportunity costs of working as in (1) becomes unionized. For simplicity, we determine 
employment from a “right-to-manage” perspective, where firms are free to adjust the quantity of 
labor demanded.
5  Unions and management bargain over wages, but employers are free to set 
employment along their labor demand curves.  Then, at union wages W (suppressing the group 
subscript i), firm profits are F(L) –WL and the union surplus is WL – S(L), where F(•) is the 
(concave) revenue function whose log marginal revenue product is expressed by equation (2), L 
                                                           
4  See for example, Blau and Kahn (2000b). 
5  If there is employer monopsony or if there is efficient bargaining over both pay and employment, then wage 
compression need not result in less employment for the groups whose wages are raised the most (Farber 1986; Card 
and Krueger 1995).   10
is employment, and S(L) is the aggregate opportunity cost of working for the L employees, with 
log marginal cost of working expressed by equation (1).   
  Under the right-to-manage labor demand constraint W=F’(L), consider an asymmetric 
wage bargain that chooses W to maximize 
F(L)-WL+ β(WL-S(L)),                                                               (5) 
where β is the relative weight of union objectives in the bargained outcome.  This objective 
function generalizes the outcome of competitive equilibrium (where β=1 yields maximization of 
the total surplus F(L)-S(L) generated by employment) to allow for different weighting of 
workers’ and employers’ surplus. If β >1, the objective weighs workers’ surplus (total wages 
minus total opportunity cost) more heavily than employers' surplus (total value of production 
minus wages). This represents in stylized fashion the impact of more unionized and/or regulated 
labor markets. Since all incomes (from employment and non-employment) enter the objective 
function linearly and with equal weight, distributional concerns within the group of workers are 
assumed away by this specification. 
The first order condition for maximization of (5) subject to W=F’(L),  
F’(L)= βS’(L)-[(∂W/∂L)L+W](β-1), 
can be rearranged to read  
S’(L)=F’(L)[1-η(L)(β-1)/β]                                                (6) 
where η(L)>0 is the elasticity of the inverse labor demand curve. The β=1 case yields 
S’(Lc)=Wc=F’(Lc), the competitive solution. At the other extreme, S’(Lm)=F’(Lm)[1-η(⋅)] when 
β→∞, and the employment level (Lm) preferred by a monopoly union is determined by a familiar 
markup term. Cases where 1<β<∞ represent intermediate labor market configurations. Quite 
intuitively, β>1 implies S’(Lm)>F’(Lm):  as long as labor demand is downward sloping, marginal 
productivity is less than average productivity, and a labor market allocation that privileges 
workers' over employers' total surplus introduces a wedge between marginal opportunity cost 
and marginal productivity.    11
  Substituting from equations (1)-(4) and (6), we have the following expressions for the log 
of the ratio of union to nonunion wages and employment (again suppressing the group subscript):  
log(Wu/Wn) = {η/(ε+η)} [log(β) – log (β -ηβ + η)]                                        (7) 
log(Lu/Ln) = (ε+η)
-1 [log (β -ηβ + η) - log(β)],                                            (8) 
where u and n subscripts signify union and nonunion quantities respectively. 
  In equation (6), the union’s markup over the opportunity cost of working evaluated at the 
unionized employment level depends on the elasticity of demand and on the parameter indexing 
the weight of workers’ objectives in labor market outcomes, but is independent of supply 
elasticity. In equations (7) and (8), however, a more elastic group labor supply (i.e., a lower ε) 
implies a larger wage increase, and smaller union employment relative to nonunion 
employment.
6  This result is quite intuitive: since the price of monopolistic wage setting is 
shutting some individuals out of employment (and compensating them with the proceeds of 
larger wage bills), high wage markups and large employment losses are less attractive when 
those who lose jobs are on a steeply declining portion of their opportunity cost schedule.  In this 
case, the optimal wage increase is relatively small and, as the disemployed move down the 
opportunity cost schedule, it is applied to a steeply smaller outside option.   
It is highly likely that the same groups (skilled, prime age, males) that command high 
wages in an unregulated labor market are also those whose labor supply is relatively inelastic 
(Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).  Compared to prime-age men, women are more likely to be 
making choices between home production and market work (in many cases both types of work), 
the elderly are more likely to be choosing between employment and retirement, and youth are 
more likely to be choosing between work and school.  Further, we may note that, at least with 
respect to youth and older individuals, union policy could be viewed as rational in the context of 
life-cycle labor supply decisions.  From the individual’s perspective, it is optimal to allocate 
periods of non-employment to stages in the life cycle when the value of alternative uses of time 
                                                           
6  Recall that the market-level participation schedule reflects the distribution of non-employment opportunities 
across the population of workers; hence, its functional form reflects properties of that distribution, rather than the 
shape of each individual’s utility function.   12
are highest.  Thus the model implies that, other things equal, unions will compress wages by age 
(for youth and for older workers too if under competition they would have earned less than the 
prime aged) and gender. For given labor demand elasticities, wage compression results in 
relatively large employment losses among young, elderly, and female groups with elastic 
participation schedules. 
 
4.2 Other determinants of relative-employment outcomes 
Of course, other features of the economic environment bear on union behavior and labor market 
outcomes. Within this model, however, only the labor supply elasticity effect can explain both 
wage compression and high disemployment of people other than prime-age males.  First, a larger 
wage markup is optimal for worker groups with less elastic labor demand (see, for example, 
Farber 1986).  While low demand elasticity also reduces the employment implications of higher 
wages, we show in Appendix A.1 that the combined effect is a greater employment loss: 
intuitively, steeper labor demand endows the union with more monopoly power, and implies a 
larger gain from restricting labor supply.  International data on demographically-disaggregated 
demand elasticities (or markups) are not available, and even in theory such parameters would in 
general depend on complementarity and substitutability relationships between groups of workers.  
However, any systematic variation of η across demographic groups would imply a larger 
employment impact for worker groups – likely to include predominantly prime-age males – that 
are less easily substituted by non-labor factors of production (Rosen, 1970).  Thus the labor 
demand elasticity effect predicts higher relative wages and lower relative employment for prime-
age men than for other groups, the exact opposite of what one finds. Second, a larger union 
bargaining power parameter β also implies higher relative wages and lower relative employment.  
To the extent that union bargaining power varies across demographic groups, as in Jimeno and 
Palenzuela’s (2001) theoretical model, we would expect it to be larger for prime-age males.  
Again, the prediction is for unions to raise wages and lower employment more for prime-age 
men than for other groups, counter to what we observe.   13
  Wage-setting centralization also bears intuitively on the model’s implications. The 
derivations above assume that a union worker who loses his/her job has no alternative 
employment available, an assumption that might characterize an encompassing union that 
negotiates a contract covering a country’s entire workforce, a stylized view of Scandinavian or 
Austrian corporatism.  At the opposite end of the spectrum is the U.S.: in our data for 1994, 
unions cover roughly 18% of American workers, and a disemployed union worker may well 
have nonunion jobs available.  Taking the U.S. case to its logical extreme, consider a union 
organizing a company in an otherwise completely competitive labor market (we assume the 
company has some monopoly power, so the union can survive).  In this case, the union workers’ 
opportunity cost is constant at the competitive wage and is perfectly elastic.  In the context of our 
model, then, there is no reason for wage compression or relative disemployment of outsiders in 
this economy (abstracting from differences across groups in bargaining power or the elasticity of 
labor demand).  At the other extreme, if we have a completely unionized economy with a central 
wage bargain then the model presented above will apply, as the union maximizes the sum of 
group-specific objective functions in the form of (5), and predict higher wages and larger 
employment losses for groups with elastic participation schedules.  This reasoning implies that 
higher coverage by centralized collective bargaining institutions will lead to greater wage 
compression and greater relative disemployment of outsiders. 
Raising wages of “outsiders” like youth, older workers and women may also be a way for 
“insiders” (prime-aged males) to reduce potential competition from such low wage workers.  
Lazear (1983) makes an analogous point in explaining why unions flatten age-earnings profiles.  
The desire to reduce competition from low wage workers has also been cited as a rationale for 
union support for living wage and prevailing wage laws in the United States, which place a floor 
under wages paid to contractors with local governments (Neumark 2001; Kessler and Katz 
2001).  Our model without demand-side interactions suggests an alternative, perhaps 
complementary, union rationale for boosting the wages of these groups (their more elastic 
participation schedules) and also highlights the relatively high value of non-employment to them.    14
To the extent this is the case, the negative employment effects of union policies that price out 
low-wage labor become more socially acceptable. 
 
4.3 Taxation 
The model above characterizes unions as negotiating wages subject to being on the labor demand 
curve. A downward sloping labor demand schedule yields inframarginal surplus to employers 
and gives workers incentives to increase wages and accept employment losses as long as the 
higher wage earned by those who are employed more than compensates for the labor income lost 
by those who would be employed at the competitive wage.  This compensation is implicit in 
writing a standard union objective function as a linear sum of employment and non-employed 
incomes. In reality, the relevant compensating transfers may take place within families, or may 
be redundant if workers are risk-neutral or take turns in unemployment over their lifecycle. 
However, it may be both theoretically and empirically interesting to note that the relevant 
transfers can be quite explicit: institutions can leave the work choice to individuals, insert tax 
wedges between employer costs and take-home pay, and distribute tax revenues to workers who 
can no longer be employed.
7  
Suppose workers’ representatives in government enact a labor tax, let employment be 
determined by individual price-taking demand and supply behavior, and distribute the tax 
proceeds to workers.  This arrangement might characterize countries with dominant labor or 
social democratic parties, such as several in Continental Europe, and represents well 
arrangements (still common in Scandinavian countries) whereby unions administer 
unemployment benefit systems. Employment must maximize employers’ profits in light of the 
gross wage, denoted Wr, to imply that employment satisfies Wr= F’(Ld), where Ld is labor 
demand. And workers’ optimal acceptance of employment, on the basis of their non-employment 
opportunities and of the net wage (1-τ)Wr, requires (1-τ)Wr=S’(Ls), where Ls is labor supply. 
                                                           
7 See Spilimbergo (1999) for a discussion of tax and subsidy determination as means of preventing competition from 
lower-productivity workers in a cross-regional context. The relevant mechanism is the same as in Lazear (1983) 
discussed above.   15
Taking into account these constraints, suppose the revenue of labor taxes is redistributed to 
workers, and the tax rate is thus chosen to maximize:   
                                                  F(Ld)-WLd+β[W(1-τ)Ls-S(Ls)+τWLs]. 
The optimal tax rate is then η(⋅)(β-1)/β. The relationship between F’(•) and L’(•) here is the 
same as in the union wage bargaining model: the elasticity of supply again has no implications 
for this tax rate, while it would bear on the Ramsey-optimal structure of tax rates aimed at 
minimizing distortions induced by raising revenue for general purposes rather than for 
distribution to workers. And the elasticity of labor supply has the same effects on relative wages 
and relative employment, here as in the union bargaining model, in the comparison of laissez 
faire and regulated labor market outcomes (see Appendix A.2).  
Even if taxes are imposed by government and not necessarily spent on union members’ 
benefits, our framework predicts that the impact of taxes on wages and employment will in 
general depend on labor supply and demand elasticities, as in ordinary models of payroll tax 
incidence.  If τ is the tax rate and log (1+τ) ≈ τ, then under competition we have 
l(τ) ≈ (a-s+εn-τ)/(ε +η)                                                    (9), 
and, after taxes,   
w(τ) ≈ (ε +η)
-1[εa + ηs - ετ - εnη].                                         (10).                         
Obviously, a larger wedge τ decreases the group’s employment, and the effect is more 
pronounced if ε +η is small (i.e., if the group’s participation and/or demand schedules are flatter).  
And after tax wages fall more for groups with less elastic labor supply.  Thus, a uniform payroll 
tax will compress wages and lead to larger disemployment effects for outsiders. The role of 
different labor supply elasticities in determining these effects is exactly the same as in the above 
analysis of union bargaining. When employment and wage differentials are driven by taxes, 
however, lower employment is accompanied by reduced labor market participation, rather than 
unemployment (see Appendix A.3).  
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4.4 Summary 
The basic implications of out theoretical approach are easily illustrated. The left-hand diagram in 
Figure 2 shows the effects on wages and employment of a wedge between labor demand and 
labor supply. The right-hand diagram repeats the exercise for the same labor demand function 
and a different labor market participation function: the impact of the same wedge on wages and 
employment, relative to the competitive outcome, is larger because the participation schedule is 
flatter. In both diagrams, the counterpart of lower employment can be open unemployment if the 
wedge is implemented by a binding wage floor, to imply that more individuals are willing to 
work than can be employed at the going wage. Or it can be lower participation, if the wedge 
represents taxes and lowers take-home pay along the labor supply curve (an outcome equivalent 
from the collective point of view of workers, as discussed above, if the revenue of tax and 
contribution schemes is redistributed to disemployed individuals).  
The key point illustrated by the model is that, upon insertion of wedges between marginal 
productivity and marginal willingness to work, differences in group supply elasticities can 
(everything else given) imply higher relative pay and larger negative employment effects for 
groups whose labor market attachment is more strongly influenced by the wage. This is obvious 
in Figure 2, and the formal expressions above also indicate that examining the implications of the 
bargaining influence of such “insider” subgroups as prime-age men cannot as readily explain 
why unionized workers do not raise their own wages as much as the wages of “outsiders”.  
Needless to say, many additional factors are potentially relevant in reality to the 
outcomes of interest. While the model treats each group as a separable unionized entity, 
complementarity or substitutability interactions across groups of workers are realistic on both the 
demand and supply side of the labor market. Our baseline model features no labor demand 
interactions across groups. This may offer a satisfactory approximation: empirically, skilled 
prime-age workers are not close substitutes for youth, female, and elderly workers, while 
individuals within these groups are closely substitutable for each other (Disney, 1996; see 
Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela, 2001, for a formal model of imperfect substitutability). It may   17
be theoretically and empirically more important to account explicitly for income effects in 
individual labor supply, and in particular for the effects (based on models of within-family 
resource distribution) of primary workers’ wages on secondary workers’ participation incentives. 
Other distributional effects could result from realistic uses of labor-tax revenues, and 
implications for relative employment outcomes could easily derive from age- and gender-
dependent subsidization of employment and non-employment states. Moreover, different groups 
within unions may have different levels of bargaining power. As long as realistic differences 
between group-level participation elasticities are preserved, however, these and other extensions 
would complicate the analysis without affecting the basic insight illustrated by Figure 2’s 
reduced-form representation.  In what follows we discuss the insight further and confront it with 
empirical information. 
 
5. Evolution over time of relative employment outcomes and institutions 
Our cross-country time-series data set builds on that constructed and analyzed by Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000).  We draw variables pertaining to overall unemployment and some labor market 
institutions from the Blanchard-Wolfers dataset.  We have added data on labor force by age 
groups, population by age groups, and unemployment rates by age groups for male and female 
workers separately.  We have also included additional labor market institutions indicators as well 
as additional data on changes in institutions over time (see Appendix B for details.)  The 
countries included are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the U.S. 
To smooth out short-run fluctuations, and in light of infrequent availability of institutional 
information, observations are arranged in 5-year intervals (1960-64 to 1990-94) along the time 
dimension; the last observation refers to the shorter 1995-96 interval.   
Table 1 reports cross-sectional and time-series demographic employment patterns, for 
the set of countries with complete observations in 1970-74 and 1995-96; Figure 3 illustrates for 
the same countries patterns of relative changes in employment incidence for prime-age vs. young   18
and prime-age vs. older individuals, separately by sex. The relative employment incidence of the 
prime aged rose in virtually every case (the only exception is the Canadian comparison of prime 
age and young men). On average, employment gaps across age groups rose by more in the other 
countries than in the United States, and in Continental European countries (such as Italy, France, 
and Spain) by more than in the Anglo-Saxon group including Canada and Australia.  These 
contrasts are stronger for the youth than for older individuals. 
Our empirical specifications below aim at explaining these developments in terms of 
variation in institutional features, also summarized for the same countries in Table 1. The 
institutional variables most directly relevant to our theoretical arguments pertain to the extent 
and character of union wage setting. Theory indicates that union involvement in relative-wage 
setting, as indexed by the model’s parameter β, should concentrate employment losses on 
“secondary” workers. And union power may affect demographic employment patterns more 
directly by influencing which group(s) bear the brunt of layoffs. For example, unions may agree 
to downsizing on the condition that older workers are separated first (OECD 1995; Casey 1992), 
or that the most recent (and younger) employees are laid off on a last-in-first-out basis.  
Time-varying data are available for collective bargaining coverage and degree of 
coordination, as well as for union density. We see in Table 1 that there was considerable 
variation across countries in collective bargaining coverage trends. Coverage fell sharply in the 
UK, with declines centered in the 1980s under the Thatcher program, and declined more 
moderately in four of the remaining countries, including the U.S.  Coverage increased 
significantly in France and Spain and was fairly stable in the remaining two countries.  On 
average, coverage in the U.S. fell by 3.5 percentage points, only somewhat more than the 
average decrease of 2.3 percentage points in the other countries.  Of course, coverage was much 
less extensive in the U.S. than elsewhere in both years. As to collective bargaining coordination, 
between 1970 and 1995 wage setting became less coordinated in Sweden, Australia and the UK, 
while increases in coordination occurred in Italy and France.  The other countries were stable in 
this regard, and of course the U.S. had the lowest level of coordination, along with Canada.  This   19
measure of coordination is not entirely satisfactory, since it does not reflect the decentralization 
that has taken place in the U.S. since the 1980s (Katz 1993). Changes in union density were even 
more diverse, with membership as a percent of wage and salary employment rising by 9-28 
percentage points between 1970 and 1995 in Spain, Sweden and Finland and falling by 8-13 
percentage points in Australia, Japan, the UK, the U.S. and France.  Union density declined by 
12 percentage points in the U.S., but rose by 3 percentage points, on average, in the non-U.S. 
countries. While union density might appear to be redundant once we know what fraction of 
workers are actually covered by collective bargaining contracts, a higher fraction of workers who 
are union members may enable unions to pose a greater threat to management, all else equal. 
Theory also indicates that labor taxes should also have a differential effect on the relative 
employment of groups with differently elastic demand and supply schedules. Accordingly, we 
include tax indicators as explanatory variables in our relative-employment regression below. The 
model presented above, however, implies that taxes should not affect unemployment, and we test 
this prediction as well. In Table 1, we see that labor tax rates (defined on an average National 
Income Accounts basis, and including income and consumption tax revenues) rose in each 
country except Japan, with especially large increases in Italy, Spain and Sweden.  Taxes in the 
U.S. rose by four percentage points less than the average for the other countries and the U.S. tax 
rate remained below the other country average.  France, Finland, Italy and Sweden had 
especially high labor tax rates as of the mid-1990s. 
In reality, of course, tax and expenditure patterns are more complex than in our simplified 
theoretical framework. To the extent that the future benefits of individual workers are linked to 
their own contribution history and this is internalized by labor supply behavior, labor taxation 
would tend to be offset by reduced take-home pay at unchanged labor cost levels.
8 However, 
such wage decreases may be impossible for workers at or near binding wage floors, particularly 
youth and possibly adult women as well. Thus, the impact of labor taxes depends on details of 
                                                           
8 See e.g. Summers (1989) for a discussion of this and related points in the context of mandated employment-related 
benefits.   20
benefit schemes, and interacts with the structure of wage distributions and wage negotiations. 
Some of our empirical specifications will allow for the latter interactions, but only limited 
information is available on the former aspects.  
Institutions other than wage setting and taxes would likely also play important roles in a 
dynamic context. More stringent employment protection (EPL) reduces employers’ propensity to 
hire and terminate workers, with fairly obvious implications for employment patterns across 
demographic groups. In high-EPL markets, young labor market entrants and women with 
intermittent participation spells should be over-represented among the unemployed and 
underrepresented among the employed, who should in turn disproportionately include mature 
male workers with high labor market attachment. The data summarized in Table 1 indicate that 
changes in employment protection between 1970 and 1995 were somewhat diverse in this set of 
countries, increasing in France, Sweden and the UK but decreasing in Finland, Italy and Spain.  
By and large, the increases came in the 1970s, while the decreases came in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Employment protection in the U.S. remained stable, and the weakest among OECD countries.   
More generous UI coverage has similar effects, to the extent that it increases the level of 
outside options in unions’ bargaining strategies and the latter aim at wage compression. Thus, 
both greater employment protection and UI generosity would raise the young-prime age 
employment rate differential.  In our data, unemployment insurance (UI) replacement rates are 
measured for the first year and the fifth year of unemployment.  The former is a measure of 
generosity for most unemployed workers, while the latter is an indicator of the duration of 
benefits. On this basis, UI systems were on average more generous in 1995 than 1970. 
Exceptions were the UK, which lowered first and fifth year replacement rates and Japan, which 
lowered its first year replacement rate.  It was during the 1970s that many UI systems became 
more generous.  Changes in the United States were less positive than those elsewhere.   
Finally, retirement-related institutions should clearly impact the relative employment of 
older workers, and that of other groups for whom older workers are substitutes or complements.  
Table 1 shows data on changing characteristics of retirement systems.  Basic replacement rates   21
in these programs rose everywhere between 1970 and 1995 with a smaller rise for the US than 
for the other countries, on average, although this average is strongly driven by Spain’s large 
increase.  Replacement ratios for special disability and unemployment schemes for older workers 
rose on average with a slightly larger rise in the US than elsewhere for disability schemes (.07 
vs. .04) and a moderately larger rise for unemployment schemes in other countries than in the US 
(.08 vs. no change).  Finally, 10-year accrual rates were constant at zero in the US but fell 
elsewhere on average, a change that reduced work incentives for older workers outside the US on 
average (the 10-year accrual rate is the change in the replacement rate of retirement benefits for a 
55-year old male who works an additional ten years).  With the exception of the slightly larger 
increase in US disability replacement rates, retirement institutions changed in ways that lowered 
work incentives for older individuals by more outside the US than for the US.
9 
  To summarize, on average, the institutions shown in Table 1 appear to have become more 
interventionist in other countries relative to the United States between 1970 and 1995.  To the 
extent that these institutions produce reduced relative employment for younger and older 
individuals, pattern of these changes is consistent with the different relative employment 
experiences summarized in the top portion of Table 1, and in Figure 3.  Specifically, as noted, 
the gap between prime aged and younger individuals sexes and prime aged and older people 
tended to rise much more in other countries than in the U.S., with especially large differences for 
youth.  These relationships are simply descriptive, however, and so far our qualitative comments 
on the empirical fit of theoretical predictions were narrowly focused on the comparison of the 
U.S. experience to that of other countries with complete data in the early 1970s and at the end of 
the sample period.  Below, we look more systematically at the relationship between changing 
institutions and employment outcomes of demographic groups in a regression context that makes 
                                                           
9 Of the explanatory variables in our analysis, the retirement variables are perhaps the most likely to suffer from 
reverse causation.  We nonetheless present results including them in order to provide a sharper test of for the impact 
of the collective bargaining and tax rate variables, our primary focus.  Results for these variables were similar when 
the retirement variables were excluded.   22
it possible to control for other influences and exploit all available time-series and cross-section 
information.  
 
6. Regression evidence 
On the basis of the simple theoretical considerations above and in Appendix A, our empirical 
specifications seek evidence of relative employment effects (from both collective wage-setting 
and taxes) and relative unemployment effects (only from collective wage setting). We are also 
interested in studying relative employment and unemployment effects from flow-based 
demographic patterns induced by EPL, and from UI and pension arrangements.  
We estimate equations of the following general form, with (11a) and (11b) estimated 
separately for men and women, and subscripts denoting “prime aged” (p) or ages 25-54, “young” 
(y) or ages 15-24, and “older” (o) or aged 55 and over:  
log(ep/ey)jt = B’Xjt + aj + bt + ujta,                                                (11a) 
        log(ep/eo)jt = B’Xjt + aj + bt + ujtb,                                               (11b) 
            log(epm/epw)jt = B’Xjt + aj + bt + ujtc,                                               (11c) 
where for country j and period t, e is the employment-to-population ratio (which we sometimes 
refer to as the employment rate), m refers to men and w refers to women, X is a vector of 
explanatory variables including the overall unemployment rate, births/population 15-24 years 
prior to the current observation, collective bargaining coverage, coordination of wage-setting, 
union density, an index of employment protection mandates, the first and fifth year UI 
replacement rates, the retirement system average wage replacement rate, replacement rates for 
older workers under special disability and unemployment schemes, the change in the retirement 
wage replacement rate for 55 year old males who work an additional ten years (the accrual rate), 
male and female normal retirement ages under public pensions, and the average total labor tax   23
rate (income plus payroll plus consumption taxes), a is a country effect, b is a period effect, and 
ua, ub and uc are disturbance terms.
10 
In equations (11a) and (11b), the dependent variable is the relative employment rate of 
the prime aged compared to younger and older individuals, respectively.  In equation (11c), we 
estimate the determinants of the employment rate gap between prime age men and prime age 
women.  Measuring relative employment effects in terms of log ratios is the appropriate metric 
here, as in the literature on the relative wage implications of demand and supply shifts (e.g. Katz 
and Murphy 1992).  In all models, we correct for the heteroskedasticity due to correlation of 
errors across observations for a country and for country-specific autocorrelation using a 
generalized least squares procedure. 
We are primarily interested in ascertaining whether labor market institutions affect 
relative employment rates of particular groups, as measured by employment-to-population ratios.  
However, variation in the dependent variable of equations like (11) reflects the different 
incidence across groups not only of unemployment but also of out-of-the-labor-force status, and 
labor market participation decisions are both theoretically interesting and policy relevant.  
Hence, we also estimate models with relative unemployment as the dependent variable.  In these 
alternative equations, we use the raw difference between the unemployment rates of the various 
groups as dependent variables.
11 
In equation (11), we control for overall unemployment and demographic factors, as well 
as institutional variables, country effects and period effects.  To the extent that the aggregate 
unemployment rate effectively controls for macroeconomic factors, this specification provides a 
sharp test of the relative employment hypotheses discussed earlier.  Specifically, we expect 
overall unemployment to have a positive effect on the young-prime age employment rate gap: 
                                                           
10  As noted by Ruhm (1998), availability of paid parental leave can influence relative employment and wage levels 
of women.   We were able to obtain some data on weeks of paid parental leave, which were kindly provided by 
Christopher Ruhm and used in Ruhm (1998) and Ruhm (2000).  Unfortunately, there was too little overlap between 
his data and ours to allow us to allow us to control for parental leave policies. 
11  Freeman and Schettkat (2000) argue that in comparing unemployment rates over time, raw differences (rather 
than, for example, log differences) are the appropriate functional form.   24
due to downward wage rigidity, unemployment is likely to be concentrated on relatively low-
productivity individuals, and the young are likely to be at the end of a queue of individuals 
looking for work.  If we did not control for macro-level unemployment, then any observed 
association between institutions and relative youth employment could be due to the effects of 
institutions on overall unemployment rather than to the kind of union relative employment 
effects we have highlighted above.  Moreover, the prime age-older employment gap is also likely 
to be positively affected by overall unemployment to the extent that retirement systems can be 
used to reduce the employment of older workers in a recession.  Overall unemployment is less 
likely to raise the male-female employment gap because women are less likely to be employed in 
cyclically sensitive sectors than men (Blau and Kahn 1981), although they are more likely than 
men to be discouraged workers (Blau, Ferber and Winkler 2002).   
Alternatively, it could be argued that results controlling for overall unemployment do not 
fully capture the effects of institutions, since institutions can also affect overall unemployment 
which in turn influences relative employment.  Thus, we also estimated models with the overall 
unemployment rate excluded, in effect estimating the total impact of institutions on relative 
employment or relative unemployment rates.
12 
We include births/population 15-24 years prior to the current observation to control for 
the relative supply of young individuals (see Korenman and Neumark 2000, and Jimeno and 
Palenzuela 2001).  At a given aggregate unemployment rate, a large cohort of young people is 
expected to cause a deterioration in their labor market prospects and thus lower the employment 
rate of the young relative to the prime-aged.  We use prior births/population rather than current 
youth population share because the former is less likely to be affected by current labor market 
                                                           
12 It is also possible that the overall unemployment rate is itself affected by the demographic composition of the 
population, rather than by macroeconomic conditions only.  Thus, in models not shown here, we replaced the raw 
unemployment rate with one that corrects for demographic composition. For each country-period observation, we 
took a weighted average of the unemployment rates for the following demographic groups:  men age 15-24, men age 
25-54, men age 55+, women age 15-24, women age 25-54, and women age 55+.  For each observation, we used the 
same set of weights, which were taken from the 16 country sample of 1980 observations. The results were virtually 
identical to the ones reported below.   25
conditions, through migration, and is therefore more likely to be exogenous with respect to 
current employment outcomes. 
 
6.1 Relative employment 
Table 2 contains basic regression results for relative employment.
13  We begin by examining the 
results for wage–setting institutions: collective bargaining coverage, coordination, and union 
density.
14  We find positive effects of collective bargaining coverage and coordination on the 
prime age-youth employment rate differential for both men and women, with significant effects 
in three of the four cases. However, union density has unexpected significant negative effects. 
With respect to the prime age-older employment gap, the three union variables have positive 
effects on the employment gap for both men and women that are significant, in all but one case.  
Finally, in the case of the male-female employment gap, union density has a significantly 
positive effect on the gap; however the coefficients on the remaining two union variables are 
insignificant, with one positive (coordination) and one negative (collective bargaining coverage). 
It is not surprising to find some perversely signed estimates for the coefficients on the 
union-power indicators. The three union variables offer admittedly imprecise measures of similar 
aspects of the institutional environment (the correlation is 0.360 for union density and collective 
bargaining coverage; 0.210 for density and coordination; 0.360 for coverage and coordination). 
In light of such multicollinearity, we evaluate the influence of these indicators as a group, using 
                                                           
13  We implemented unit root tests for our panel using a method suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999).  Because of 
our short panel, usually seven periods, we interpret these results very cautiously.  To test for unit roots, we computed 
Dickey-Fuller statistics for each country and their associated significance levels, using the approximations in 
MacKinnon (1994).  We then implemented the suggestion of Maddala and Wu (1999) to aggregate these individual 
country tests using an exact Fisher test, under which –2 times the sum of the logs of the significance levels has a chi-
squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to two times the number of countries.  We accepted the null 
hypothesis of a unit root for most of our variables under at least one of MacKinnon’s (1994) approximations.  We 
then repeated the process on the residuals from each of the models in Tables 2 and 3 and in each case rejected the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration (albeit not taking into account the fact that the residuals are themselves estimated 
variables due to the short panels).  Thus, under these tests, we reject the hypothesis of spurious regression across our 
time-averaged observations.   
14  As explained in Appendix B, for countries for which the first period we observe coverage is, say, t0, we assign the 
t0 value to all prior periods.  Our basic results were the same when we included a dummy variable for these 
observations.   26
the regression coefficients to predict the change in relative employment which would occur if all 
the union-related variables were simultaneously changed from their average level in one region 
of the world to their average level in another. Since the coefficients are estimated controlling for 
country effects, these simulations give useful indications as to the effects of plausible long-run 
differences in the three interrelated explanatory variables.  
The “Scandinavia vs. North America” line of Table 2 shows the estimated relative-
employment effects of changing the union environment from that observed in Canada and the 
U.S. (union density=27.8%, coverage=29.6%, coordination=1.0 on average) to that observed in 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (density=68.2%, coverage=80.4%, coordination=2.35). 
The following lines compare North America to Northern Europe, North America to Southern 
Europe, and the U.S. to the full set of non-U.S. countries, all comparisons involving substantial 
increases in all of the union-related variables.
15 Simulation results are similar in all cases.  
Moving from North American values for the union-related variables to the values in each of the 
other regions, or from U.S. to non-U.S.values, substantially increases the prime age-youth and 
prime-age older employment gaps for both men and women.  The prime age-youth effect ranges 
from .16 to .25 log points for men and from .16 to .36 log points for women, while the prime 
age-older effect ranges from .23 to .40 log points for men and from .37 to .53 log points for 
women.  The estimated effects are all highly statistically significant, with the exception of the 
female prime-age youth effect for Scandinavia vs. North America, which is significant at the 
11% level.  In contrast to our results for the prime age-youth and prime age-older comparisons, 
union wage-setting institutions are not found to have significant effects on male-female 
employment differentials. 
Turning to our findings for the other policies, we see that employment protection is found 
to widen employment gaps by age in three out of four cases (the prime age-youth contrast for 
                                                           
15  Northern Europe consists of Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands and has density of 32.7%, coverage 
of 87.5%, and coordination of 2.21; Southern Europe includes Italy, Portugal, and Spain and has values of 34.1% for 
density, 76.3% for coverage, and 1.86 for coordination.  In the U.S., density is 20.5%, coverage is 22.0% and 
coordination takes its minimum value of 1.0, while in the non-U.S. countries, these variables average 43.6% 
(density), 72.2% (coverage), and 2.02 (coordination) respectively.     27
women, and the prime age-older contrast for both men and women) with two of the estimated 
effects being statistically significant.  The negative coefficients estimated for male prime age-
youth employment differentials and male-female employment differentials are counter to 
expectations, but not statistically significant.    
Labor taxes are found to have positive effects on both male and female prime age-youth 
employment differentials and the male-female prime age employment differential. While these 
point estimates are consistent with the idea that tax wedges lead young workers and women to 
forsake employment and engage in their relatively more attractive non-employment activities 
(such as education or home production), the effects are not statistically significant. Moreover, 
taxes have negative effects on the prime-age older worker relative-employment comparisons, 
with a significant effect for the male prime age-older employment differential.  These results are 
not easily interpreted, and may reflect the pattern of public expenditures not accounted for by the 
retirement and UI variables included in the model.
16   
Overall UI one and five year replacement rates narrow prime age-young and prime age-
older worker employment differentials in each case, with several significant effects.  These 
results suggest perhaps greater coverage by regular UI systems for prime age workers than for 
other groups (we discuss the special UI systems for older workers below).    However, we 
discount this interpretation because, when we examine relative unemployment rates of prime age 
vs. older or younger workers (Table 3), we find opposite-signed effects for the one and five year 
replacement rates in three of four cases, and these are usually insignificant.  With respect to 
male-female comparisons, though, higher first and fifth year replacement rates both significantly 
raise the male relative unemployment rate, and the first year replacement rate significantly 
                                                           
16 In particular, the availability and quality of schooling may be an important determinant of cross-country and time-
series patterns in youth labor market participation. As an attempt to partially control for the effects of total 
government spending, which may be confounded with labor taxes, we added a control for the fraction of 
employment in the public sector, using the data used and kindly made available by Algan, Cahuc, and Zylberberg 
(2002).  We do not emphasize these results because government employment is clearly endogenous and because we 
lose about 9% of the sample because of missing data.  Nonetheless, the impact of labor taxes was similar to that in 
Table 2.  Even controlling for the level of public expenditures, the types of public expenditures may be correlated 
with labor tax rates, complicating the interpretation of the tax variable.   28
lowers the male relative employment rate.  The fifth year replacement rate has an insignificantly 
positive effect on the male relative employment rate.  These male-female comparisons suggest 
greater UI system coverage of men than women. 
The retirement-related variables have mixed effects on relative employment.  Several 
variables have the expected effects on the relative employment of older workers.  For example, a 
higher pension replacement rate significantly raises the employment of prime age vs. older 
workers for women.  Moreover, higher replacement rates for special disability and 
unemployment programs for older workers, and lower retirement ages each have a positive effect 
on the male prime age-older worker employment gap, with significant effects in each case except 
for disability programs.  On the other hand, a higher overall pension replacement rate has an 
insignificant, negative effect on male prime age vs. older employment, and a higher accrual rate 
for 55 year olds actually lowers the relative employment of men over 55.
17  
Finally, looking at economic and demographic conditions, we find that the overall 
unemployment rate has a positive effect on the prime age-youth gap for men and women and the 
prime age-older gap for men.  The prime-age youth coefficients are highly significant, while the 
male prime age vs. older worker unemployment rate coefficient is significant at the 7% level 
(two-tailed test).  The births variable has a positive effect on the prime age-youth employment 
gap, with a significant effect for women, suggesting cohort crowding and imperfect substitution 
between youth and adults (see also Korenman and Neumark 2000).   
 
6.2 Relative unemployment 
Table 3 shows results for relative unemployment rates using the same specification as in Table 2.  
Focusing on the combined effect of the wage-setting variables shown in the last four rows of the 
table, we usually find insignificant effects of unions on the relative unemployment of youth and 
                                                           
17  Our results for the retirement variables are partially consistent with those of Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999), who 
examined the labor force participation rate of men 55-64 for 15 countries for the 1971-95 period.  We do not discuss 
their results in detail here because we have a different set of dependent variables and a more extensive set of labor 
market institutions than in their paper, as well as a considerably different focus.   29
older individuals.
18  These age-related results for unemployment are consistent with our 
theoretical analysis if these groups have good alternative uses of their time when disemployed: 
younger individuals may pursue educational options,
19 while older workers may retire.   
Interestingly, while union wage-setting institutions were found to have small and 
insignificant effects on male-female employment differentials, they are found to lower the male 
unemployment rate relative to the female unemployment rate by 4.4 to 6.2 percentage points, and 
these effects are significant at the 0.02%-0.05% level.  These are sizable effects, since on 
average the male-female unemployment rate differential is –1.4 percentage points.  The results 
are consistent with women being drawn into the labor force by the prospect of landing a high-
paying union job in countries where strong wage centralization tends to price them out of work. 
Although the relative-employment effects that would be implied by this mechanism are not 
apparent in the data, it may be that some women are able to find work in unregulated sectors, or 
that public employment absorbs the women who would otherwise be disemployed by high union 
wage floors (Blau and Kahn 1999; 2002). 
We now turn to a brief consideration of some of the other variables in the model.  Lagged 
birth rates appear highly relevant to youth relative unemployment, confirming the results of 
Jimeno and Palenzuela (2001) and their references. With respect to policy variables, UI 
indicators are not a significant determinant of youth relative unemployment.  This is not 
surprising since in many countries young labor market entrants are not entitled to unemployment 
benefits. The most interesting results are for the employment protection index which is found to 
lower unemployment rates of the prime aged compared to younger workers—the coefficient on 
employment protection is significant at the 5.6% level for men and the 0.7% level for women 
                                                           
18 The exceptions are two cases (Northern Europe vs. North America and Southern Europe vs. North America) in 
which greater unionization raises the unemployment of prime age women vs. older women. 
19  This reasoning is consistent with Kahn’s (2000) finding for a cross section of 15 OECD countries that collective 
bargaining coverage had a negative effect on youth relative employment but was positively associated with school 
attendance among young adults.  However, he found that enrollment did not fully account for the negative effect of 
union coverage on the relative employment of youth.  Taking Kahn’s findings in conjunction with those reported 
above suggests that unions may increase the share of out-of the-labor force youth who are neither at work nor at 
school.    30
(two-tailed tests).  There is no evidence that employment protection raises unemployment of 
older individuals relative to the prime aged. If downsized older workers flow out of the labor 
market (into retirement) rather than into unemployment, this finding is consistent with our 
finding above that EPL tends to lower the relative employment of older men.  Further, for both 
men and women, labor taxes appear to lower the unemployment of the prime aged relative to 
older individuals, to also lower the unemployment of young vs. prime age women and to raise 
male unemployment rates compared to women’s.  As was the case for relative employment, 
taxes may be correlated with the composition of spending which may affect participation rates 
and thus unemployment rate.
 20  Finally, we again obtained mixed results for the retirement 
variables.  Higher overall retirement replacement rates lower older workers’ relative 
unemployment rates.  In conjunction with the negative (women) to roughly zero (men) effect of 
this variable on older workers’ relative employment (Table 2), these unemployment effects 
suggest that retirement benefits reduce older workers’ labor force participation.  A higher 10 year 
accrual rate raises older workers’ relative unemployment as do higher disability and UI 
replacement rates for older workers.   The accrual rate result may reflect greater incentives for 
older workers to look for work, while the UI effect likely reflects the job search requirement of 
this program.  While the disability results are counterintuitive (i.e. disability benefits raise older 
workers’ relative unemployment rates), Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) suggest that the OECD-
based measure of disability scheme generosity may not accurately capture the extent to which 
countries in practice use the disability system as a way of reducing the labor supply of older 
workers.   
 
6.3 Interactions 
The results so far suggest an important role for labor market institutions in explaining 
international differences in the relative employment of youth and older individuals and the 
unemployment of women compared to men.  The models in Tables 2 and 3 had a simple linear 
                                                           
20 Adding the public employment share to the regressions did not have a major impact on the tax effects.     31
structure in which, for reasons of parsimony, only main effects of each variable appear.  
However, we might expect recessionary overall macroeconomic conditions or cohort crowding 
to have more severe negative relative employment effects on youth, for example, the more rigid 
relative wages are with respect to economic conditions.  And employment institutions such as 
seniority-based layoffs will produce larger prime age vs. youth employment differentials when 
there is a recession than when there is an expansion.  Hence, we ran all of our models with 
interactions between overall unemployment and the other variables in the equation and between 
the prior births variable and each institution. We do not present full results of these models, 
which feature many interaction coefficients of limited individual interest.  However, as we now 




6.4 Institutions and relative employment trends 
In Figures 4-6 we consider the extent to which institutions can help us explain relative 
employment trends and the relative unemployment of women (we omit other unemployment 
comparisons, for which wage-setting institutions had insignificant effects). We focus on a 
comparison of changes in outcomes between 1975 and 1995 because we have a fairly large set of 
countries—14 in total—with data for each of these two years.
22  Each figure plots the predicted 
changes in relative employment (unemployment) against the actual changes.  The predicted 
changes are based on three models:  a) a model including only controls for economic and 
demographic conditions, and country and period effects; b) a model with these controls plus the 
institutional variables (i.e., indicators of wage setting institutions, employment protection, 
unemployment insurance generosity, retirement variables and labor taxation) as reported in 
                                                           
21  An additional possible set of interactions concerns those between the various indicators of labor market 
institutions, as emphasized by Belot and van Ours (2000). We were unable to find any clear pattern of results when 
we tried interacting various institutions with each other, and we concluded that the data are not rich enough to 
support such models. 
22 The countries are Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.   32
Tables 2 and 3; and c) the same model with unemployment-institutions, unemployment-prior 
births, and prior births-institution interactions.  We then fit OLS regression lines to each set of 
predicted changes.  We have also added a 45° line along which the predicted changes exactly 
equal the actual changes.  The closeness with which each regression line tracks the actual 
changes line indicates how well the model fits the data on actual changes.  By comparing the fit 
of the model with institutions included to that with institutions excluded, we can get an idea of 
the contribution of the institutional variables to an understanding of the observed trends within 
countries. 
Figures 4 a and b summarize our results for the employment of young men and women 
relative to the prime aged.  In both cases, the models with institutions perform extremely well 
and considerably better than the models with institutions excluded.  Moreover, the interaction 
model does even better than the main effects model for women and about the same as the main 
effects model for men.  The results for the employment of older men and women relative to the 
prime aged are shown in Figure 5 a and b.  The results are qualitatively similar to the findings for 
the young.  Again, institutional main effect models improve our explanatory power for both men 
and women, and allowing interactions substantially improves the fit for older women.    
The results for the employment of prime-aged women compared to prime-aged men are 
shown in Figure 6a, while Figure 6b gives comparable results for the relative unemployment of 
this group.  The findings for relative employment of prime-aged women are similar to those for 
older individuals.  The model with institutions included tracks the changes to some extent and 
performs better than a model that does not include institutions, and adding interactions leads us 
to do even better.  Finally, the main effects results for the changes in the relative unemployment 
of prime-age women are very strong: the trend line fitted to the main effects model including 
institutions is much closer to the actual changes than the model excluding these variables.  And, 
the model with interactions does even better and tracks the actual changes quite closely.   
Overall, Figures 4-6 show that institutional change is an important component of the 
explanation for changes in relative employment from the 1970s to the 1990s.  The interaction   33
between institutions and overall unemployment and demographic factors is also often an 
important factor, but usually no more important quantitatively than adding institutional main 
effects.  In earlier work on the overall unemployment rate, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and 
Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002), found that interactions between institutions and macro shocks 
were the single most important factor explaining unemployment rate changes, although Nickell, 
Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini (2001) dispute whether it is necessary to appeal to such 
interactions.  The results in Figures 4-6 show noticeable but less important effects for 
interactions between institutions and the economic environment for explaining relative 
employment changes than Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002) 
find for explaining overall unemployment.  Part of this discrepancy is likely to be due to the fact 
that we are controlling for overall unemployment here, which itself already contains the effects 
of institution-macro shock interactions.
23 
 
6.5 Omitting aggregate unemployment 
So far, all of the results we have discussed have come from equations that controll for the overall 
unemployment rate.  This implies that the positive effects of, for example, collective bargaining 
institutions on prime age-youth employment differentials are not simply due to high overall 
unemployment levels.  The union effects estimated here mean that, at a given overall level of 
labor market tightness, more unionized economies with more centralized wage setting have 
lower employment of youth and older individuals relative to the prime aged.  Roughly speaking, 
for the same size queue of job seekers (the unemployed), the young and the old are less likely to 
be employed relative to the prime aged in more unionized and coordinated regimes.  However, 
by controlling for overall unemployment, we may be understating the full effects of labor market 
institutions on employment differentials, since institutions can also affect overall unemployment.  
                                                           
23  The interaction models in Figures 4-6 include an unemployment rate-births interaction, in addition to the 
institution-unemployment and institution-births interactions.  When we re-estimated the models excluding the 
unemployment rate-births interaction, the results were virtually identical to those in the Figures.  We therefore 
conclude that the additional explanatory power we derive from the interaction models comes from interactions 
involving institutions.   34
We examined this issue by re-estimating the models of Tables 2-3, excluding the overall 
unemployment rate.  This modification computes the full effects of institutions.  Selected results 
from this exercise are shown in Appendix Tables A1-A2. 
The results not controlling for unemployment are qualitatively very similar to those 
controlling for unemployment.  As would be expected, the effects of collective bargaining 
institutions on prime aged vs. youth employment are larger in magnitude when we do not control 
for unemployment.  This can be seen by comparing Table 2 with Table A1.  The difference in 
magnitude suggests that these institutions raise overall unemployment which then in turn raises 
the employment gap between the prime-aged and the young.  We caution the reader, however, 
that the differences in union effects across the two specifications are not statistically significant, 
except for the Scandinavia-North American comparison for young men vs. prime age men, in 
which the impact of unionization is significantly larger (at roughly the 6% level, two-tailed test) 
not controlling for unemployment than controlling for unemployment.   
 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have investigated the impact of labor market institutions on the relative 
employment of labor market subgroups. We pointed out that the effects of institutions on 
different groups’ employment may be taken into account by unions and policymakers and fine-
tuned so as to concentrate reduced employment opportunities on individuals who can find good 
uses of their time outside of employment. Our empirical approach controls for country-specific 
fixed effects and macroeconomic and demographic conditions. The results suggest that countries 
where union wage-setting institutions exert a more pervasive influence on labor market outcomes 
tend to feature relatively low employment levels among the young and the elderly, and relatively 
high unemployment rates among women, while preserving high employment rates for prime age 
men.   
The emphasis of our theoretical perspective on distributional features could be motivated 
from first principles invoking financial market imperfections, or other departures from the   35
standard representative-agent paradigm underlying competitive equilibrium (along the lines of 
e.g. Bertola’s, forthcoming, analysis of EPL’s motivation and effects). Similar assumptions could 
rationalize reasons for wage compression beyond simple monopoly union models. For example, 
union members may advocate wage compression for purposes of ex post insurance (Agell and 
Lommerud, 1992), whereby risk averse workers agree to wage equalization ex ante, before 
knowing how their laissez faire wage will be affected by labor demand shocks.  Wage 
compression may also serve the purpose of enhancing union solidarity - a public good from the 
union’s point of view - among employed members (Kahn 1993).  
From these points of view, the non-employment of low-productivity workers brought 
about by higher wage floors may be something the union has to accept, in order to achieve 
insurance and maintain solidarity through wage compression. While employment of women, 
youth, and older individuals may be reduced, it is still possible that these institutional 
interventions raise the expected income or utility of families. These mechanisms, however, focus 
on employed workers and are more easily applicable to unions representing homogeneous pools 
of workers than to the phenomena we focus on.  Considerable evidence suggests that labor 
market institutions such as collective bargaining compress wages across as well as within age 
and gender groups (Blau and Kahn 2002).  This paper’s results suggest that loss of employment 
is the price of relatively high wages for low-productivity individuals who are ex ante 
identifiable.
24 And, if the price of high wages is no employment, even ex post wage compression 
in the face of less predictable product-market or health shocks may not be as attractive to (ex 
post) low-productivity workers as insurance and solidarity views would make it -  at least in the 
absence of conceptually independent subsidies to workers who fail to obtain a job because of the 
union’s wage structure.  
                                                           
24 Acemoglu et al (2001) suggest that unions may redistribute income across workers with different skills in a model 
where ex post wage compression offers insurance and commitment benefits. Variables correlated with skills, such as 
age and gender, are observable and persistent in reality, and it may be less than fully realistic to suppose that they 
only become known after employment is obtained.   36
Observed employment and wage patterns, however, are fully consistent with the model 
we have proposed here, where rent-extracting unions purposely negotiate the largest wage 
premiums for groups with the most elastic labor supply because employment losses are less 
costly for those with alternatives that are nearly as good as paid employment.  Without denying 
the validity of alternative views of unions’ role and objectives, our model contributes by 
highlighting the relatively high value of non-employment for some groups of low-wage workers, 
to imply that demographically biased negative employment effects of union policies that price 
out low-wage labor are more socially acceptable.   37
Appendix A:  Further Theoretical Results 
 
A.1  Effect of Demand Elasticity on the Union Impact on Employment 
Equation (7) shows the ratio of the log of union to nonunion wages (referring to group i and suppressing 
the subscript i): 
Log(Wu/Wn) = {η/(ε+η)} log [1/(1-η+η/β)], 
where η is the inverse labor demand elasticity (0 <η<1) and β is the union bargaining power parameter 
(β>1).  And equation (8) shows the ratio of the log of union to non-union employment: 
log(Lu/Ln)=log(1-η+η/β)/(ε+η) 
where ε is the inverse labor supply elasticity and is positive.  Denote log(Lu/Ln) by r.  Taking the 
derivative of r with respect to η, we have: 
dr/dη=(ε+η)
-2{(ε+η)(-1+1/β)(1-η+η/β)
-1-log(1-η+η/β)}.                          (A1) 
To simplify this expression, define: 
  z ≡ η-η/β                                                                (A2) 
where, 0<z<1, since 0<η<1 and β>1. Substituting (A2) into (A1), we have: 
dr/dη = [ε+η]
-2{(ε+η)(-1+1/β)(1-z)
-1 – log(1-z)} 
  = [ ε+η]
-2 {ε(-1+1/β) +z(z-1)
-1 – log(1-z)}                                        (A3)  
From the concavity of the log function, we have 0>log(1-z)/z > (z-1)
-1, and , since ε(-1+1/β) is negative it 
follows that dr/dη is negative:  the less elastic labor demand is, the higher the union wage markup is and 
the lower is union employment relative to nonunion employment.  Intuitively, with more monopoly 
power, the gain to restricting labor supply is greater. 
 
A.2 Relative employment effects of the tax wedge 
Inserting a wedge τi>0 between the group’s marginal demand and participation schedules increases group 
i’s log unit labor costs to  
wi(τi) =(ηisi+εiai–ηiεi ni +ηiτi)/(ε i+ηi)= wi(0)+τi ηi/(ε i+ηi)                       (A5)        
and decreases its employment to 
                                         li(τi)=(ai–si+εini–τi)/(ε i +η i) = li(0)–τi/(εi +ηi).                                              (A6) 
As noted in the main text, a smaller ε i magnifies the impact of a given wedge τi: taking differences of 
expressions in the form (A5) and (A6) for groups i=1,2 with the same τi and ηi yields the text’s 
expressions (9) and (10) for relative wage and employment effects. In this Appendix, we discuss the 
implications of different wedges τi and different elasticities ηi, linking these parameters to each other and 
to labor’s welfare weight (β) in the simple framework outlined above.  
Optimizing for group i (or maximizing an additively separable objective function with similar terms for 
this and other groups) implies that  
τi =ηi(βi–1)/βi                                                                          (A7). 
Hence: 
(i.)  The policy wedge is larger (and so are its wage and employment effects, for given elasticities) for 
groups of workers with larger βi weight. In principle, variation of this parameter across 
demographic groups could be measured by institutional information or by observed markups. In 
practice, the relevant variables are not available on a cross-country comparable basis. To the extent 
that this parameter indexes the group’s bargaining power, however, it seems unlikely to be   38
relatively large for the young, female, and elderly groups that bear the brunt of labor market 
regulation’s employment impact. 
(ii.) Keeping  βi constant, the policy wedge is also larger for groups with larger ηi, since a larger wage 
markup is optimal for worker groups with less elastic labor demand (see, for example, Farber 1986).  
In addition, since the solution with tax wedge leads to the same union wage markup as the union 
bargaining model, lower labor demand elasticity has the same implications as shown in Appendix 
A.1:  lower demand elasticity raises the union relative wage effect and makes for a larger reduction 
in union employment. 
 
A.3 Relative unemployment effects 
As noted before, optimal wage floors and optimal taxes (from the point of view of the asymmetric wage 
bargain) have the same implications for the wedge between the marginal revenue product of labor and the 
marginal willingness to work.  While the wage markup under the optimal tax and union bargaining 
scheme is the same, the two models have different implications for unemployment.  Unlike labor taxes, 
collective wage setting influences unemployment levels, to an extent that also depends on participation 
elasticities. In fact, denoting with Ld and Ls the quantities of labor demanded and supplied at the new 
union wage,  the unemployment rate of group i, 
                                                                    Ui=(Lsi-Ldi)/Lsi,                                                                   (A8) 
is increased not only by the decline of log employment shown by equation (8), but also by the wage 
increase ∆wi, shown in equation (7), which attracts ∆wi/εi additional workers into the labor market. Not 
only the wage increase implied by a given degree of union bargaining power β and inverse labor demand 
elasticity η, but also that increase’s impact on labor force participation are larger with groups with more 
elastic participation schedule (smaller εi).   
Of course, more complicated models of labor supply could imply that workers facing fewer jobs 
will leave the labor force even if wages are high (Mincer 1976).  But this Appendix shows that 
unemployment effects of unions could be even larger than employment effects if high wage floors attract 
people into the labor force. 
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Appendix B: Data sources and definitions 
 
This paper’s data set is based on that constructed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), documented 
at http://econ-wp.mit.edu/RePEc/2000/blanchar/harry_data/. The data set contains macroeconomic and 
institutional data on 26 OECD-countries for 8 five-year periods covering the time span 1960-1999. We 
have added data on labor force by age groups, population by age groups, and unemployment rates by age 
groups for male and female workers separately.  
The labor force and population data are taken directly from the ILO database “Economically 
Active Population 1950-2010”. The name format of the labor force and population data is vv(v)gcccc 
where  
vvv = lf   for labor force,  
vvv = pop  for population  
g =      m for male, f for female  
cccc=xxyy   for age group from xx to yy years of age (65_ refers to 65 and above) 
The data on unemployment rates by age group have been constructed from data found in the 
OECD-publication Labour Force Statistics (various issues). These are country-source data, and we did 
not attempt to harmonize their definition. To compute the average unemployment rate for each 5 year 
period we calculate the arithmetic mean of the yearly unemployment rates within the period. To obtain 
similar data on as many countries as possible, we also aggregate the data to broad age groups by 
computing the labor force weighted average of the time-averaged unemployment rate of the relevant age 
groups. The labor force weights themselves are constructed as linearly interpolated weights from the labor 
force data used above. The name format of the unemployment data is urgxxyy where g= m (male) or f 
(female), and xxyy=age group from xx to yy years of age (55_ refers to 55 and above). 
The measures for the labor market institutions are taken from several sources.  We use Blanchard 
and Wolfers’ (2000) measures of time-varying employment protection legislation, and we collected 
additional institutional indicators.  
We take union density, collective bargaining coverage and coordination, and labor tax rate data 
from the data appendix to Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini (2001).  Collective bargaining coverage 
was available for some countries from 1960 to 1999 and for other countries from 1980-94.  We used 
interpolation and assigned the authors’ earliest figure to all dates before its date.   
The UI year 1 and year 5 replacement rates were taken from a OECD database and refer to the 
entire 1960-96 period. Data on retirement system characteristics were taken from Blöndal and Scarpetta 
(1999). 
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l
Figure 2: The different effects of similar institutional wedges for groups with differently sloped market participation 
schedules. Arrows indicate wage and employment effects relative to laissez faire; thick lines denote 
unemployment, if the wedge is implemented by minimum wage. 
w w 
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Figure 3:  Changes Over Time in Relative Employment-to-Population Ratios Across Age Groups
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change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95
AUSTRALIA 0.20 0.13 0.54 0.53 -0.41 0.53 1.08 0.70 0.29 -0.23 0.89 -0.63 1.43 -0.46
CANADA 0.46 -0.05 0.58 0.41 -0.10 0.37 0.82 0.76 0.28 -0.25 0.84 -0.67 1.08 -0.32
FINLAND 0.36 0.29 0.72 0.70 0.34 0.39 1.09 0.67 0.25 -0.10 0.27 -0.20 0.63 -0.24
FRANCE 0.40 0.66 0.86 0.67 0.08 1.03 1.04 0.79 0.33 -0.01 0.65 -0.39 0.83 -0.27
ITALY 0.37 0.45 0.84 0.35 -0.18 0.78 1.28 0.70 0.49 -0.16 1.04 -0.49 1.48 -0.14
JAPAN 0.48 0.27 0.29 0.20 0.02 0.37 0.46 0.39 0.12 -0.10 0.58 -0.20 0.74 -0.01
SPAIN 0.23 0.54 0.59 0.57 -0.37 0.87 0.79 0.85 0.71 -0.24 1.32 -0.56 1.52 -0.28
SWEDEN 0.36 0.24 0.64 0.37 -0.01 0.58 1.06 0.26 0.21 -0.22 0.59 -0.56 1.00 -0.67
UK 0.21 0.18 0.60 0.43 -0.20 0.38 1.09 0.46 0.21 -0.18 0.62 -0.39 1.12 -0.36
USA 0.46 0.03 0.56 0.35 0.17 0.22 0.70 0.57 0.38 -0.30 0.67 -0.49 0.81 -0.27
NON-US 








Rate:  First Year
UI Replacement 
Rate:  Fifth Year
1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95
AUSTRALIA 85.0 -5.00 2.25 -0.75 43.37 -8.17 32.18 7.82 1.00 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.10
CANADA 40.0 -3.00 1.00 0.00 30.62 6.78 42.44 9.56 0.60 0.00 0.49 0.09 0.10 0.00
FINLAND 95.0 0.00 2.25 0.00 51.30 28.30 51.69 12.31 2.40 -0.30 0.29 0.35 0.10 0.06
FRANCE 85.0 8.50 1.75 0.25 21.70 -11.80 57.91 10.09 1.97 1.13 0.47 0.08 0.07 0.06
ITALY 85.0 -2.50 1.50 1.00 37.00 1.70 55.71 15.29 4.00 -0.60 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.00
JAPAN 28.0 -6.00 3.00 0.00 31.74 -7.94 25.88 -1.88 2.80 0.00 0.41 -0.12 0.00 0.00
SPAIN 68.0 9.00 2.00 0.00 9.00 9.20 25.91 20.09 4.00 -0.90 0.38 0.27 0.00 0.00
SWEDEN
 (2) 86.0 1.50 2.50 -0.50 66.76 23.22 59.47 14.53 1.20 1.20 0.24 0.49 0.00 0.00
UK 70.0 -23.00 1.50 -0.50 49.80 -13.10 43.19 3.81 0.58 0.12 0.31 -0.13 0.16 -0.03
USA 21.0 -3.50 1.00 0.00 27.24 -12.34 40.06 5.94 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.07 0.04 0.00
NON-US 
AVERAGE 71.33 -2.28 1.97 -0.06 37.92 3.13 43.82 10.18 2.06 0.07 0.30 0.14 0.06 0.02
Table 1:  Relative Employment and Institutional Patterns in Selected Countries, 1970-1995
55+,               
Men vs. Women
Women,           
25-54 vs. 15-24
25-54,             
Men vs. Women
Men,              
25-54 vs. 15-24
Men,              
25-54 vs. 55+
Women,           
25-54 vs. 55+
15-24,             
Men vs. Womenlabor_market_institutions_demographic_employment_nber.doc 6/17/2002 11:59 AM 

















Rate, Males Age 55
(3)
1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95 1970
change   
70-95
AUSTRALIA 0.30 0.11 0.20 0.08 0.21 0.06 0.00 0.00
CANADA 0.42 0.09 0.22 0.11 0.16 0.01 0.19 -0.19
FINLAND 0.54 0.06 0.46 0.14 0.30 0.34 0.09 -0.05
FRANCE 0.60 0.05 0.50 -0.25 0.38 -0.15 0.24 -0.07
ITALY 0.62 0.18 0.48 0.12 0.25 0.49 0.22 -0.12
JAPAN 0.48 0.04 0.16 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.02
SPAIN 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.16 0.42 -0.05 0.00 0.00
SWEDEN
 (2) 0.72 0.02 0.74 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.17 -0.17
UK 0.34 0.16 0.33 -0.05 0.19 -0.02 0.02 0.08
USA 0.47 0.09 0.38 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
NON-US 
AVERAGE 0.50 0.14 0.41 0.04 0.23 0.08 0.11 -0.06
(1) Country-specific levels and changes, for the 1970-74 and 1995-96 periods, of the difference in the logarithms
of employment rates across the age and gender groups indicated.
(2) Note that for Sweden, due to data availability, the following collective bargaining infomation is shown above:
1990 data for 1970 and the average of 1990 and 1994 data for 1990.
(3) Increase in Retirement Benefit Replacement Rate for a 55-year old male who works 10 more years.  Data 
shown are for 1967 and 1995.labor_market_institutions_demographic_employment_nber.doc 6/17/2002 11:59 AM 

















Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
overall unemployment rate 1.5942 0.2387 0.4033 0.2215 1.9120 0.3794 -0.0494 0.3623 0.3507 0.3936
prior births/population 2.0193 4.9472 -2.9796 3.1092 12.1457 3.8803 -17.1193 4.6425 -0.8606 5.2685
coll barg coverage 0.0028 0.0008 0.0036 0.0006 0.0055 0.0017 0.0061 0.0008 -0.0016 0.0012
coordination 0.0789 0.0447 0.0340 0.0276 0.0526 0.0423 0.0834 0.0452 0.0158 0.0455
union density -0.0021 0.0009 0.0041 0.0008 -0.0047 0.0014 0.0026 0.0013 0.0035 0.0016
employment protection -0.0103 0.0160 0.0554 0.0145 0.0857 0.0185 0.0133 0.0218 -0.0142 0.0198
UI rep rate:  year 1 -0.0494 0.0605 -0.0821 0.0333 -0.2034 0.0729 -0.0870 0.0690 -0.2110 0.0696
UI rep rate: year 5 -0.0751 0.1077 -0.1833 0.0564 -0.1517 0.1816 -0.3449 0.1014 0.1243 0.1261
labor tax rate 0.3389 0.2107 -0.2946 0.1357 0.0137 0.2053 -0.2395 0.2491 0.0919 0.2185
public pension replacement rate 0.0016 0.0017 -0.0004 0.0011 0.0049 0.0018 0.0050 0.0021 -0.0037 0.0020
accrual rate, 10 yrs, age 55 -0.0009 0.0034 0.0153 0.0019 -0.0025 0.0037 0.0015 0.0026 0.0069 0.0035
UI rep rate:  older workers 0.1650 0.0963 0.2953 0.0639 0.4475 0.1236 0.0756 0.1000 0.0495 0.1480
Disability rep rate: older workers 0.0021 0.3485 0.2147 0.2222 -0.1256 0.3574 -0.5769 0.3332 -0.3038 0.3524
female retirement age -0.0229 0.0119 -0.0311 0.0058 -0.0171 0.0118 0.0017 0.0065 0.0031 0.0103
male retirement age -0.0348 0.0190 -0.0297 0.0084 -0.0242 0.0190 0.0081 0.0129 -0.0010 0.0195
country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
period effects yes yes yes yes yes
sample size 101 101 101 101 101
Net effect of collective bargaining coverage, union density and coordination:
Scandinavia vs. North America 0.1647 p=.0334 0.3988 p<.0001 0.1624 p=.1110 0.5285 p<.0001 0.0813 p=.3573
Northern Europe vs. North America 0.2493 p=.0002 0.2729 p<.0001 0.3610 p=.0003 0.4661 p<.0001 -0.0554 p=.4034
Southern Europe vs. North America 0.1868 p=.0002 0.2258 p<.0001 0.2740 p=.0005 0.3723 p<.0001 -0.0384 p=.4602
Total Sample other than US vs US 0.1760 p=.0033 0.3087 p<.0001 0.2283 p=.0091 0.4481 p<.0001 0.0128 p=.8411
Note:  standard errors are corrected for country-specific heteroskedasticity and country-specific first order autocorrelation.  
Accrual rate is the change in the retirement replacement rate if a 55 year old works an additional ten years.  Joint effect of collective bargaining
coverage, union density and coordination is evaluated at sample differences between the two groups (e.g. Scandinavia vs. North America) for these
variables. Scandinavia includes Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway; North America includes Canada and the US; Northern Europe includes
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium; Southern Europe includes Italy, Portugal and Spain.labor_market_institutions_demographic_employment_nber.doc 6/17/2002 11:59 AM 
 
Table 3:  Selected Generalized Least Squares Regression Results for Relative Unemployment 
Explanatory Variables
(urate men2554 - urate 
men1524)
(urate men2554 - urate 
men55+)
(urate women2554 - 
urate  women1524)
(urate women2554 - 
urate  women55+)
(urate men2554 - urate 
women2554)
Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
overall unemployment rate -1.0047 0.0911 0.0449 0.0589 -1.4358 0.1220 0.1985 0.0708 -0.0397 0.0660
prior births/population -3.8631 1.0275 1.6949 0.5831 -3.1016 1.6560 3.4742 0.6161 -2.5510 0.6913
coll barg coverage 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0008 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0003
coordination -0.0136 0.0096 0.0081 0.0063 -0.0131 0.0143 0.0210 0.0069 -0.0066 0.0078
union density 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002
employment protection -0.0112 0.0059 -0.0026 0.0028 -0.0176 0.0065 0.0034 0.0045 -0.0044 0.0032
UI rep rate:  year 1 0.0192 0.0175 0.0159 0.0087 0.0240 0.0236 0.0076 0.0119 0.0255 0.0121
UI rep rate: year 5 -0.0114 0.0317 -0.0324 0.0166 -0.0341 0.0361 -0.0095 0.0255 0.0660 0.0225
labor tax rate 0.0468 0.0515 -0.1107 0.0254 0.2265 0.0631 -0.1425 0.0329 0.1430 0.0378
public pension replacement rate 0.0014 0.0005 0.0013 0.0003 0.0009 0.0008 0.0036 0.0003 -0.0029 0.0004
accrual rate, 10 yrs, age 55 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0028 0.0004 0.0029 0.0013 -0.0027 0.0006 0.0008 0.0005
UI rep rate:  older workers 0.0069 0.0267 -0.0317 0.0142 -0.0448 0.0344 -0.0084 0.0207 -0.0606 0.0190
Disability rep rate: older workers -0.1825 0.0907 -0.1510 0.0466 -0.1847 0.1281 -0.1066 0.0563 0.0369 0.0572
female retirement age 0.0063 0.0025 0.0008 0.0011 0.0091 0.0035 0.0015 0.0017 -0.0036 0.0016
male retirement age -0.0012 0.0042 0.0060 0.0020 -0.0028 0.0070 0.0047 0.0032 0.0055 0.0025
country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
period effects yes yes yes yes yes
sample size 101 101 101 101 101
Net effect of collective bargaining coverage, union density and coordination:
Scandinavia vs. North America 0.0224 p=.2285 -0.0161 p=.1941 0.0448 p=.1324 0.0122 p=.3965 -0.0617 p=.0005
Northern Europe vs. North America 0.0016 p=.9347 -0.0132 p=.1741 0.0329 p=.2372 0.0317 p=.0135 -0.0540 p=.0004
Southern Europe vs. North America 0.0045 p=.7631 -0.0120 p=.1044 0.0293 p=.1696 0.0217 p=.0297 -0.0436 p=.0004
Total Sample other than US vs US 0.0140 p=.3814 -0.0151 p=.1005 0.0385 p=.1135 0.0162 p=.1622 -0.0527 p=.0002
Note:  standard errors are corrected for country-specific heteroskedasticity and country-specific first order autocorrelation.  
Accrual rate is the change in the retirement replacement rate if a 55 year old works an additional ten years.  Joint effect of collective bargaining
coverage, union density and coordination is evaluated at sample differences between the two groups (e.g. Scandinavia vs. North America) for these
variables. Scandinavia includes Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway; North America includes Canada and the US; Northern Europe includes
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium; Southern Europe includes Italy, Portugal and Spain.labor_market_institutions_demographic_employment_nber.doc 6/17/2002 11:59 AM 

















Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
overall unemployment rate ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
prior births/population 8.8967 5.3054 -1.9542 3.0090 17.1633 3.6909 -11.6889 4.3496 -0.6167 5.2024
coll barg coverage 0.0040 0.0011 0.0037 0.0006 0.0061 0.0020 0.0051 0.0007 -0.0014 0.0012
coordination 0.1111 0.0496 0.0290 0.0279 0.0418 0.0518 0.0132 0.0493 0.0167 0.0457
union density 0.0007 0.0010 0.0047 0.0008 -0.0018 0.0014 0.0041 0.0011 0.0039 0.0015
employment protection -0.0240 0.0184 0.0472 0.0142 0.0410 0.0203 0.0072 0.0148 -0.0259 0.0171
UI rep rate:  year 1 -0.0665 0.0750 -0.0724 0.0327 -0.1389 0.0782 -0.0631 0.0562 -0.1912 0.0677
UI rep rate: year 5 -0.2177 0.1282 -0.1999 0.0535 -0.2462 0.1801 -0.3298 0.0817 0.1069 0.1274
labor tax rate 0.5002 0.2233 -0.2268 0.1365 0.2041 0.2008 -0.0326 0.2487 0.1166 0.2145
public pension replacement rate 0.0035 0.0022 0.0004 0.0010 0.0089 0.0020 0.0050 0.0018 -0.0027 0.0016
accrual rate, 10 yrs, age 55 0.0036 0.0039 0.0155 0.0019 -0.0021 0.0039 -0.0039 0.0030 0.0068 0.0035
UI rep rate:  older workers 0.1880 0.1030 0.2896 0.0635 0.4258 0.1294 0.0804 0.0936 0.0533 0.1474
Disability rep rate: older workers -0.1842 0.4015 0.1257 0.2205 -0.6258 0.3789 -1.0448 0.2737 -0.4290 0.3256
female retirement age -0.0119 0.0125 -0.0310 0.0059 -0.0154 0.0127 0.0095 0.0072 0.0041 0.0104
male retirement age -0.0374 0.0214 -0.0298 0.0084 -0.0180 0.0191 0.0246 0.0120 -0.0007 0.0194
country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
period effects yes yes yes yes yes
sample size 101 101 101 101 101
Net effect of collective bargaining coverage, union density and coordination:
Scandinavia vs. North America 0.3807 p<.0001 0.4177 p<.0001 0.2984 p=.0093 0.4426 p<.0001 0.1071 p=.1840
Northern Europe vs. North America 0.3700 p<.0001 0.2726 p<.0001 0.3984 p=.0008 0.3306 p<.0001 -0.0430 p=.4916
Southern Europe vs. North America 0.2870 p<.0001 0.2275 p<.0001 0.3123 p=.0009 0.2748 p<.0001 -0.0276 p=.5695
Total Sample other than US vs US 0.3289 p<.0001 0.3187 p<.0001 0.3131 p=.0022 0.3590 p<.0001 0.0307 p=.5952
Note:  standard errors are corrected for country-specific heteroskedasticity and country-specific first order autocorrelation.  
Accrual rate is the change in the retirement replacement rate if a 55 year old works an additional ten years.  Joint effect of collective bargaining
coverage, union density and coordination is evaluated at sample differences between the two groups (e.g. Scandinavia vs. North America) for these
variables. Scandinavia includes Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway; North America includes Canada and the US; Northern Europe includes
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium; Southern Europe includes Italy, Portugal and Spain.labor_market_institutions_demographic_employment_nber.doc 6/17/2002 11:59 AM 
 
Table A2:  Selected GLS Regression Results for Relative Unemployment, Unemployment Rate Excluded
Explanatory Variables
(urate men2554 - urate 
men1524)
(urate men2554 - urate 
men55+)
(urate women2554 - 
urate  women1524)
(urate women2554 - 
urate  women55+)
(urate men2554 - urate 
women2554)
Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
overall unemployment rate ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
prior births/population -6.7270 1.1743 1.8892 0.5724 -6.9801 1.7053 4.1169 0.4952 -2.5826 0.6899
coll barg coverage -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0008 0.0003
coordination -0.0061 0.0134 0.0086 0.0063 -0.0100 0.0202 0.0176 0.0067 -0.0069 0.0075
union density -0.0011 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0017 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0002
employment protection 0.0019 0.0066 -0.0033 0.0025 -0.0028 0.0097 -0.0014 0.0040 -0.0034 0.0028
UI rep rate:  year 1 0.0314 0.0232 0.0174 0.0084 0.0179 0.0348 0.0035 0.0114 0.0245 0.0120
UI rep rate: year 5 0.0577 0.0456 -0.0346 0.0161 0.0351 0.0560 -0.0188 0.0233 0.0691 0.0218
labor tax rate 0.0316 0.0624 -0.1114 0.0249 0.1108 0.0794 -0.1186 0.0291 0.1406 0.0376
public pension replacement rate -0.0017 0.0007 0.0014 0.0002 -0.0024 0.0011 0.0038 0.0003 -0.0030 0.0003
accrual rate, 10 yrs, age 55 0.0000 0.0011 -0.0028 0.0004 0.0027 0.0017 -0.0023 0.0006 0.0007 0.0004
UI rep rate:  older workers -0.0458 0.0341 -0.0339 0.0136 -0.0665 0.0519 0.0071 0.0200 -0.0626 0.0189
Disability rep rate: older workers 0.0830 0.1035 -0.1559 0.0450 0.0724 0.1561 -0.1461 0.0534 0.0470 0.0541
female retirement age 0.0058 0.0029 0.0006 0.0011 0.0039 0.0050 0.0013 0.0015 -0.0037 0.0016
male retirement age -0.0019 0.0052 0.0062 0.0020 -0.0032 0.0089 0.0038 0.0030 0.0057 0.0026
country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
period effects yes yes yes yes yes
sample size 101 101 101 101 101
Net effect of collective bargaining coverage, union density and coordination:
Scandinavia vs. North America -0.0680 p=.0228 -0.0136 p=.2473 -0.0640 p=.1176 0.0247 p=.0927 -0.0658 p<.0001
Northern Europe vs. North America -0.0304 p=.2887 -0.0116 p=.2260 -0.0004 p=.9916 0.0350 p=.0163 -0.0557 p=.0002
Southern Europe vs. North America -0.0263 p=.2365 -0.0107 p=.1391 -0.0031 p=.9140 0.0254 p=.0247 -0.0451 p=.0001
Total Sample other than US vs US -0.0455 p=.0708 -0.0132 p=.1314 -0.0298 p=.3647 0.0243 p=.0521 -0.0554 p<.0001
Note:  standard errors are corrected for country-specific heteroskedasticity and country-specific first order autocorrelation.  
Accrual rate is the change in the retirement replacement rate if a 55 year old works an additional ten years.  Joint effect of collective bargaining
coverage, union density and coordination is evaluated at sample differences between the two groups (e.g. Scandinavia vs. North America) for these
variables. Scandinavia includes Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway; North America includes Canada and the US; Northern Europe includes
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium; Southern Europe includes Italy, Portugal and Spain.